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Are Small Rural Banks
Vulnerable to Local
Economic Downturns?




n recent years, supervisory agencies have
streamlined the bank examination process to
focus attention on identified risk areas rather
than the full scope of bank operations (Board of
Governors, 1997). If supervisors can identify the
potential risks, they can recommend preventive
measures and respond more quickly to actual
banking problems when they arise. Because of this
shift to risk-focused supervision, off-site surveil-
lance of banks has become much more important.
Supervisory economists and staff who gather and
interpret bank and economic data must direct
examiners to areas of heightened risks.
Historical experience in the financial services
industry demonstrates that institutions exposed to
serious risk can run into trouble quickly. Many
commercial banks were exposed to fluctuations in
commercial real estate markets in the latter half of
the 1980s. A sharp decline in real estate prices
caused several hundred banks to fail (FDIC, 1997).
In addition, agricultural bank failures represented
a large share of the banks that failed from 1984 to
1987. These failures occurred within a few years
after the peak in farmland prices, reflecting the
inability of agricultural banks to absorb the losses
accruing from falling farm incomes (Kliesen and
Gilbert, 1996). Because these banks were not
diversified in terms of geography or industry, the
losses eventually overwhelmed the equity accu-
mulated during the prosperous years. If exposure
to these risks had been targeted as potential prob-
lems earlier, they might have been addressed
sooner and their negative impacts dampened. 
Because of the way that U.S. banking laws
evolved, many U.S. banks have geographically
concentrated offices and operations. Historically,
national and state banking laws prevented banks
from branching into other counties and states.
Justification for such legislation was to promote
sound and stable banking markets by limiting
competitive pressures on existing banks and to
prevent an excessive concentration of financial
power (Spong, 2000, p. 146, and Jayaratne and
Strahan, 1997). As we have noted, however, such
laws left banks vulnerable to local economic
downturns.
Over the last few decades, branching restric-
tions gradually have been lifted. By 1990, most
states had granted banks permission to branch
within state boundaries, and most states permitted
some form of interstate banking (Berger et al.,
1995, pp. 188-89). The Riegle-Neal Interstate
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994
removed most remaining barriers to interstate
branching. Bank holding companies (BHCs) were
allowed to acquire a bank in any state and—as of
June 1, 1997—merge it with an existing bank.
1
Hence, most of the legal barriers to geographical
expansion have been removed.
Despite liberalized branching laws, thousands
of small banks with geographically concentrated
offices remain and are likely to exist for some
time.
2 Some argue that small banks have a com-
parative advantage over large banks in small-
business lending for which little public informa-
tion about the borrower’s creditworthiness is avail-
able. This advantage (and thus incentive to remain
small) arises because small banks can originate
and monitor relationship loans at a lower cost
than larger banks.
3 Relationship lending requires
that loan officers have autonomy to set underwrit-
ing standards and discretion to monitor and evalu-
ate borrowers. Management at small banks can
more easily monitor loan officers; consequently,
small banks are better able to develop the commu-
nity relationships necessary to underwrite small
business loans. In addition, anecdotal evidence
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suggests that branch managers of large banks are
rotated more often into and out of communities as
they progress in their organizations; therefore,
they do not develop the same personal relation-
ships with customers that long-time community
bankers develop. To contain loan origination and
monitoring costs, larger banks often prefer to lend
to customers for which credit information is more
readily available. Consequently, community banks
are likely to continue engaging in small-business
lending where assessments of credit quality rely
heavily on intangibles.
Two additional factors may limit community
bank consolidation, at least in the short- to medi-
um-term. First, most community banks are unit
banks; larger banks seeking to expand often prefer
to purchase banks with branching networks.
Second, community banks that are family-owned
and managed are put on the market infrequently.
Hence, even some relatively unprofitable commu-
nity banks could remain in the banking industry
for some time. 
Despite the continued presence of geographi-
cally concentrated banks, we find little evidence to
support the hypothesis that such banks located in
the Federal Reserve’s Eighth District are particular-
ly vulnerable to local economic downturns. Spec-
ifically, we find that county economic data are
only weakly correlated with small rural bank per-
formance. Our results provide little justification for
bank supervisors to require geographically con-
centrated banks to take special measures to reduce
their vulnerability to local economic downturns. In
addition, we find little basis for systematically





In this section, we investigate the empirical
relationship between the performance of geo-
graphically concentrated banks and local econom-
ic activity. Banks with geographically concentrated
operations are potentially vulnerable to local eco-
nomic contractions because of an inherent con-
centration of loan and deposit customers.
Laderman, Schmidt, and Zimmerman (1991) find
that a bank’s location significantly influences its
choice of borrowers because monitoring costs
increase as the distance between lender and bor-
rower increases. Hence, banks tend to make loans
to the people and businesses that are geographi-
cally nearby. Should many firms in the area
become distressed at the same time, the bank’s
credit quality will likely suffer more than credit
quality at a bank with credit dispersed across eco-
nomic markets. In addition, liquidity risk is likely
to be higher at geographically concentrated banks
because such banks often rely on deposits from
fewer entities. In contrast, a more geographically
diversified bank can attract deposits from a larger
base of individual and business customers; there-
fore, large swings in deposits and withdrawals are
less likely (Liang and Rhoades, 1988).
If local economic activity affects bank perfor-
mance, this association is more likely to be evident
in the data for small banks with offices in rural ar-
eas than for other banks. Smaller banks (as mea-
sured by assets) typically have more geographically
concentrated operations and, due to their lower
levels of capital, lend to smaller, less diversified
businesses. Therefore, the performance of small
banks may depend more heavily on local condi-
tions. Bank performance also is more likely to be
correlated with local economic data in rural rather
than urban areas because rural banks tend to lend
to a relatively high percentage of firms and resi-
dents in their own counties. If enough of those
firms or residents are faring poorly, local economic
data should reflect the poor performance. In con-
trast, banks located in metropolitan areas usually
lend to a smaller fraction of all the firms and indi-
viduals in their area. Poor performance by individ-
ual small businesses and households will likely
have less effect on measures of aggregate economic
activity in urban areas than in rural areas. 
METHODS
Data Collection
We obtained financial data on small rural
banks—those with less than $300 million in assets
located outside of a Metropolitan Statistical Area
(MSA)—between 1990 and 1997 from the Reports
of Condition and Income (call reports). We chose
the $300 million size limit because it is commonly
used in the banking industry to define small
banks, yet the size cutoff is high enough that most
banks in rural areas are included in the sample.
4
We excluded banks less than five years old
4 Indeed, banks with assets less than $300 million file a call report
that is different from the report filed by larger institutions.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS
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because new banks have erratic ratios that could
bias the results against finding a correlation of
performance with economic data. We did not
exclude banks involved in merger activity as long
as the post-merger bank size did not exceed $300
million. Inclusion of these banks potentially bias-
es the sample against finding correlation if the
merger results in a more diverse operating market
for the acquiring bank, but we deal explicitly with
that issue below. Although banking data are readi-
ly available before 1990, county-level labor data
were significantly revised in 1990, and a consis-
tent time series before then is not available.
Because labor data are lagging indicators of the
business cycle, the sample period should pick up
the effects of both the 1990-91 recession and the
subsequent expansion.
To make our study directly relevant to the
Federal Reserve’s Eighth District risk-focused process
and to limit county-level data collection to a reason-
able size, we looked at the Eighth District only, which
includes banks in Arkansas, eastern Missouri, south-
ern Illinois, southern Indiana, western Kentucky,
western Tennessee, and northern Mississippi.
We obtained four different pairs of county and
state economic data from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics and the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
These data include unemployment rates, employ-
ment growth, personal income growth, and per
capita personal income growth. The criteria for
including a regional economic variable in the data
set were that the information had to be published
at least annually at both the state and county lev-
els and enough observations had to be available in
each county to make meaningful statistical infer-
ences.5 Because neither the county economic data
nor the bank performance data were seasonally
5 County bankruptcy data are available annually, but personal
bankruptcies had little to do with economic conditions during the
1990s. Building permits are also available; however, rural counties
often lack enough observations to make reliable inferences.
1
Summary Statistics: Bank Performance and Economic Variables, 1990-97
Standard
Number Mean deviation Minimum Maximum
Bank performance measures
Adjusted ROA 6,741 1.75 0.65 –5.12 10.67
Nonperforming loans to total loans 6,741 1.23 1.63 0.00 78.35
Loan losses to total loans 6,741 0.33 0.70 –9.65 16.71
OREO to total assets 6,741 0.20 0.43 0.00 13.67
Economic variables
County unemployment rate 6,740 7.55 2.61 2.20 22.20
State unemployment rate 6,741 5.98 1.00 3.50 8.76
County employment growth 5,781 1.30 3.92 –15.42 33.97
State employment growth 6,741 1.09 1.95 –3.59 7.44
County per capita income growth 6,034 2.41 3.09 –12.68 21.51
State per capita income growth 6,035 1.84 1.30 –0.74 4.86
County personal income growth 6,034 2.90 3.04 –12.73 23.65
State personal income growth 6,035 2.64 1.43 –0.11 6.28
NOTE: The bank sample includes Eighth District banks with less than $300 million in assets located outside an MSA, and the perfor-
mance measures are standard ratios used in bank supervision to assess bank performance. County and state economic data are
matched by year with the headquarters county and state of each bank in the sample. County economic data have much higher stan-
dard deviations than state economic data.
Adjusted ROA, net income plus provision expense as a percentage of total assets; nonperforming loans, loans past due 90 days or
more plus nonaccrual loans as a percentage of total loans; loan losses, charge-offs minus recoveries as a percentage of total loans;
and OREO, other real estate owned as a percentage of total assets.
Table 128 MARCH/APRIL 2001
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adjusted, we used year-end call report data and
average annual economic data to smooth out
monthly and quarterly fluctuations. Summary
statistics for the sample banks and economic vari-
ables are reported in Table 1.
To measure bank performance, we used three
asset quality ratios and one earnings ratio that are
commonly used in bank supervision to monitor a
bank’s condition. Deterioration in asset quality
and, hence, earnings are the primary reasons that
small banks become distressed. The asset quality
ratios chosen were nonperforming loans to total
loans, net loan losses to total loans, and other real
estate owned (OREO) to total assets. Nonperforming
loans are loans 90 days or more past due or
nonaccruing, net loan losses are charge-offs less
recoveries, and OREO is the value of the tempo-
rary real estate assets on the bank’s books as a
result of debtor default. The earnings ratio chosen
was adjusted return on assets (ROA) or net income
plus provision expense, divided by assets. We
added back provision expense because the asset
quality measures already account for credit
effects. Other things equal, we expected asset
quality and earnings to improve with employment
and income growth and to worsen with a rise in
the unemployment rate.
Regression Model
We used ordinary least-squares (OLS) regres-
sion and tobit analysis to test whether rural bank
performance depends on state and county eco-
nomic variables. We used OLS for each regression
involving adjusted ROA and net loan losses; how-
ever, we used a tobit procedure for each regression
in which nonperforming loans or OREO was the
dependent variable because these two variables
are censored at zero.6
A simple methodology that regresses bank
performance measures on local economic data
suffers from omitted variable bias because several
factors besides local economic conditions affect
bank performance. We included bank-specific
intercepts, lagged bank performance ratios, and
state economic data as explanatory variables to
reduce the bias. The intercept terms control for
bank-specific effects on the levels of performance
ratios. For example, some banks may have higher
ROA than other banks because managers at the
more profitable banks are more competent or take
more risks than other banks’ managers. Lagged
bank performance ratios control for persistence in
performance. For example, a bank that has high
nonperforming loans one year is more likely to
have high nonperforming loans the next year
because it takes time for borrowers to improve
their cash flows and for banks to sever their rela-
tionships with customers who are in poor finan-
cial condition.7 Finally, research has demonstrated
a strong link between bank performance and state
economic data; therefore, we included state eco-
nomic data in the initial regression equation to
reduce omitted variable bias.8
We regressed the four bank performance
ratios on lagged performance ratios and the four
pairs of county and state economic variables
between 1990 and 1997:
(1)
In equation (1), BPit represents bank i’s perfor-
mance at time t. The α i coefficient is the bank-
specific intercept term. The variables CEconit and
SEconit represent, respectively, county and state
economic data relevant to bank i at time t. We
matched economic data with the county and state
of the bank’s headquarters. We tested lagged eco-
nomic variables, but they contributed insignificant
explanatory power to the model. We ran a sepa-
rate regression for each pair of county and state
economic variables to avoid multicollinearity
across the different economic variables. For exam-
ple, the first regression included the county and
state unemployment rates of the bank’s headquar-
ters, the second regression included only county
and state employment growth, and so on.
To properly assess the vulnerability of small
rural banks to local economic activity, the primary
focus was on the economic and statistical signifi-
6 Results from a straight OLS regression for nonperforming loans and
OREO were quite similar to the tobit results because the non-
negative constraint was nonbinding for a majority of banks.
7 Nickell (1981) has shown that, in a fixed-effects model, a lagged
dependent variable coefficient will be biased unless the number of
time periods is large. To a lesser extent, this bias can carry over into
the other variables if they are correlated with the lagged dependent
variable. This potential bias is not worrisome in our context, howev-
er, because our primary concern is with the explanatory power of
each county economic variable relative to its state counterpart. In
addition, we tested the effect of this bias by dropping the lagged
dependent variable from the analysis. The results showing that state
economic data influenced bank performance much more than
county data remained unchanged.
8 See Neely and Wheelock (1997), FDIC (1997), and Laderman,
Schmidt, and Zimmerman (1991).
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cance of the county coefficient, γ 1. A significant
coefficient indicated that economic changes at the
county level had statistically important effects on
small rural bank performance. We placed little
emphasis on the overall model fit (R
2) because we
were not attempting to fully explain bank perfor-
mance.
Economic Significance Benchmarks
Economic significance is more difficult to
assess than statistical significance. One cannot
simply use the size of the regression coefficients
to judge economic significance because of differ-
ent variances among the regression variables. For
example, state unemployment rates are typically
less variable than county unemployment rates. An
increase of 1 percentage point in the state unem-
ployment rate represents a lower probability event
than a 1 percentage point change in a county
unemployment rate. To control for the differing
variances of economic and bank data, we normal-
ized the regression coefficients by calculating a
“beta” coefficient, β = γσ x/σ y, where γ is the regres-
sion coefficient, σ x is the standard deviation of the
independent variable, and σ y is the standard devia-
tion of the dependent variable. The ratio β —repor-
ted in the tables as a percentage—measures the
effect of a one standard deviation increase in the
economic variable on the bank performance vari-
able relative to a one standard deviation change in
the bank performance variable. Because previous
research demonstrated a link between bank per-
formance measures and state economic data, we
used the size of the β coefficients for the state eco-
nomic variables as benchmarks for the economic
significance of the county β coefficients.
Although a β coefficient provides a measure of
the relative importance of an independent vari-
The “Large Change” Test as a Measure of Economic Significance
2-Rated Number 3-Rated Number of
banks of 2-ratings banks 3-ratings Difference
Bank performance measures
Adjusted ROA 1.61 636 1.12 150 0.49
Nonperforming loans to total loans 1.53 546 2.64 129 1.11
Loan losses to total loans 0.42 546 0.89 129 0.47
OREO to total assets 0.24 546 0.52 129 0.28
Minimum Maximum Difference
Economic variables
County unemployment rate 6.48 8.69 2.20
State unemployment rate 4.91 7.16 2.25
County employment growth –0.39 3.36 3.76
State employment growth –0.68 3.35 4.03
County personal income growth 1.10 4.65 3.55
State personal income growth 1.02 4.35 3.34
County per capita personal income growth 0.51 4.27 3.76
State per capita personal income growth 0.58 3.45 2.86
NOTE: The “large change”test measures the percentage of a large change in the bank performance variable explained by a large
change in the economic variable. The ratio is computed as χ = γ∆ X/∆ Y, where γ is the regression coefficient, ∆ X is a large change in
the economic variable, and ∆ Y is a large change in the bank performance ratio. A large change in the bank performance ratio is
measured by calculating the average difference between a CAMELS 2-rated bank and a CAMELS 3-rated bank in the sample. For
example, the average 2- and 3-rated banks had nonperforming loan-to–total loan ratios of 1.53 percent and 2.64 percent, respec-
tively. The difference of 1.11 percent is a “large”change. The benchmark for a “large”change in the economic variable is the maxi-
mum change in the average annual values over the sample period. For example, the minimum average county unemployment rate
between 1990 and 1997 was 6.48 percent, and the maximum county unemployment rate was 8.69 percent. The difference of 2.2
percentage points is considered a “large”change.
Adjusted ROA, net income plus provision expense as a percentage of total assets; nonperforming loans, loans past due 90 days or
more plus nonaccrual loans as a percentage of total loans; loan losses, charge-offs minus recoveries as a percentage of total loans;
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able, it does not provide an adequate measure of
the overall importance of a given variable for
explaining movements in bank performance
ratios. For example, suppose that we regress non-
performing loans on county and state unemploy-
ment rates. The regression coefficients are 7 basis
points and 17 basis points, respectively, and the β
coefficients are 4 percent and 10 percent. The
state unemployment rate clearly dominates the
county unemployment rate using β coefficients to
judge economic significance, but whether the 7 or
17 basis point coefficient values are economically
large remains unclear. The answer depends on the
definition of “large” changes in both nonperform-
ing loans and unemployment rates.
We constructed a “large-change” test to deter-
mine whether a regression coefficient was eco-
nomically significant. This test measures the per-
centage of a large change in the bank performance
ratio explained by a large change in the economic
variable. Bank examination ratings guided our
assessments of large changes in bank performance
ratios. Each time a bank is examined, regulators
assign a composite rating and an individual rating
to each of the CAMELS components. (CAMELS is
an acronym that stands for Capital adequacy, Asset
quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, and
Sensitivity [to interest rate risk]). CAMELS ratings
range from 1 (the safest banks) to 5 (the riskiest
banks). Banks with composite ratings of 1 and 2
are considered to exhibit “strong” and “satisfacto-
ry” performances, respectively. Banks that fall
below a 2 rating may prompt supervisory action,
which could include a board resolution, a memo-
randum of understanding, a written agreement, or
a cease and desist order. Hence, regulators consid-
er a drop from a 2 rating to a 3 rating to be a sig-
nificant change.
The differences in average bank performance
ratios between 2- and 3-rated banks serve as our
benchmarks for evaluating economic signifi-
cance.9 We used only bank performance ratios at
the time of the bank examination instead of using
all performance ratios for 2- and 3-rated banks to
avoid endogeneity issues that might arise if super-
visors required 3-rated banks to improve perfor-
mance. Inclusion of all the ratios would potentially
decrease the differences between 2- and 3-rated
banks. Table 2 displays average measures of per-
formance ratios for banks rated 2 and 3 between
1990 and 1997. For example, the average bank
with a 2-rated earnings component had an adjust-
ed ROA of 1.61 percent; the average bank with a
3-rated earnings component had an adjusted ROA
of 1.12 percent. We consider the 49 basis point
spread between the two sets of banks to be eco-
nomically large.
The last step in measuring economic signifi-
cance using the large-change test was to identify
economically important changes in the economic
variables. We identified large changes as the typi-
cal changes over the course of a business cycle.
The 1990 to 1997 sample period includes the
1990-91 recession and the subsequent recovery
and expansion. To identify large changes in the
economic data over the business cycle, we calcu-
lated the yearly means of each county and state
economic variable and computed the differences
between the maximum and minimum values. For
example, the maximum annual average county
unemployment rate was 8.7 percent in 1991, and
the minimum value was 6.5 percent in 1997, a dif-
ference of 2.2 percentage points. Large changes in
economic variables are also displayed in Table 2.
Somewhat arbitrarily, we interpreted a regres-
sion coefficient as economically significant using
the large-change test if the maximum change in
the economic variable over the business cycle
accounted for over one third of the difference in
the average bank performance ratio between a
2- and 3-rated bank. The large-change economic
significance ratio was calculated as χ = γ∆ X/∆ Y,
where γ is the regression coefficient and ∆ X and
∆ Y are economically large changes in the indepen-
dent and dependent variables, respectively. For
example, suppose that a 1 percentage point
change in the county unemployment rate increas-
es the nonperforming loan-to–total loan ratio by 7
basis points. If ∆ X is 2.2 percentage points and ∆ Y is
111 basis points, then χ = 13.9 percent (7 × 2.2 / 111)
of the change in the bank performance ratio. We
would conclude that the county unemployment
rate coefficient is economically insignificant.
Values of χ with negative signs imply that the




The regression results indicate that county
9 We also computed median differences in bank performance mea-
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economic data are weakly correlated with bank
performance measures. Results are reported in
Table 3 along with both measures of economic
significance (β and χ ).10 None of the county-level
coefficients was both statistically significant and
had the theoretically expected sign, suggesting
that county economic activity did not have an
important influence on bank performance. In con-
trast, state economic data were highly correlated
with bank performance measures. In these regres-
sions, 15 out of 16 state-level coefficients were
statistically significant at the 1 percent level and
had the expected sign. The β coefficients for state
variables were typically several times higher than
the county β coefficients. In addition, the large-
change measure of economic significance showed
that the state unemployment rate accounted for
economically significant changes in nonperform-
ing loans, loan losses, and OREO. State personal
income growth rates were also economically sig-
nificant, accounting for 42.2 percent of a large
change in adjusted ROA.
Collinearity between each pair of county and
state economic data may have reduced the signifi-
cance of the county-level coefficients. Multi-
collinearity is likely because county data were de-
rived explicitly from state data, and correlation co-
efficients between the county and state data were
high. Although collinearity among explanatory
variables does not bias OLS or tobit estimates, the
state economic coefficient might have reduced the
statistical importance of the county economic co-
efficient. To account for this potential effect, we re-
ran equation (1) removing state economic variables
from the equation. Results are reported in Table 4.
When state-level data were excluded from the
regressions, several county-level economic vari-
ables were statistically significant. In particular,
we found that changes in county unemployment
rates and employment growth affect bank asset
quality. Personal income growth, however, had no
statistically significant effect on earnings or asset
quality.
Although the county unemployment rate was
statistically significant when regressed against
asset quality ratios, its economic significance was
low. The β coefficient from a change in the coun-
ty unemployment rate was just 7.8 percent for
nonperforming loans, about half the economic
significance of the state unemployment rate coef-
ficient reported in Table 3. Similar results held for
loan losses and OREO. The large-change test con-
firmed the lack of economic significance. 
Because the correlation between county eco-
nomic data and bank performance was not eco-
nomically significant, the implication is that small
rural banks with concentrated operations are not
particularly vulnerable to local economic down-
turns, as currently measured by county-level eco-
nomic data. The results also suggest that econom-
ic data gathered at the county level are not useful
to systematically assess community bank perfor-
mance; however, state economic data may be use-
ful for such a purpose.
11
Sensitivity of Results to Sample
Selection
The poor correlation between bank perfor-
mance and county-level economic data could
exist because the bank sample included a signifi-
cant number of banks that were not sensitive to
local economic conditions for one reason or
another. By removing those banks from the sam-
ple, we may be able to uncover a significant rela-
tionship. If a significant correlation is found for a
smaller subset of banks, then supervisors might
wish to focus their attention on this set of banks. 
Perhaps some banks had a significant portion
of their branches, and hence loan activity, in other
counties; therefore, including such banks in the
sample weakened the correlation of bank perfor-
mance with local economic performance. We
matched each rural bank in the full sample with
the county economic data in which the bank’s
headquarters resided, even though the bank may
have had significant operations in other counties.
To reduce the bias from including banks with
significant operations outside of their headquar-
ters county, we re-ran the regressions including
only those banks that had 100 percent of their
deposits in the headquarters county of the com-
munity bank. At the end of each year, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and Office
of Thrift Supervision publish the Summary of
Deposits, which contains branch deposit informa-
10 Because the results for personal income and per capita personal
income were similar, we report only the personal income results.
11 Besides state data, we experimented with county, contiguous coun-
ty, nearest MSA, and county data aggregated over only the Eighth
District portion of each state. Although coefficients on economic
data from the nearest MSA and the Eighth District portions of states
are similar to the state-level results, the state economic data are
preferred because they are available with a shorter time lag and are
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tion for FDIC-insured institutions as of June 30 of
that year. Bank deposits inside and outside of a
particular county can be computed from the
Summary of Deposits data. Of the 6,717 observa-
tions in the full sample, 5,758 of them (86 per-
cent) had all deposits in one county. Results are
presented in Table 5.
The results from including only banks with all
their deposits in the headquarters county were
nearly identical to the full sample results. None of
the 16 county economic coefficients was econom-
ically significant. Banks with all deposits within a
single county are no more vulnerable to local eco-
nomic downturns than banks with deposits in
multiple counties. 
Another possibility is that many of the com-
munity banks in our sample are controlled by
larger bank holding companies. Community banks
controlled by large BHCs may behave differently
from the more isolated banks because they may
have a higher share of syndicated loans and other
interaction with entities outside their communi-
ties. To ensure that none of the banks in the sam-
ple was controlled by a large BHC, we included
only banks in our sample in which the consolidat-
ed assets of the BHC were no more than twice the
assets of the bank. For example, a rural bank with
$50 million in assets owned by a BHC with more
than $100 million in consolidated assets would
have been excluded from the sample. Most banks
in the Eighth District were controlled by BHCs
smaller than this cutoff because the sample size
fell from 6,717 to 4,837, a decline of only 28 per-
cent. The results are reported in Table 6.
The statistical and economic significance of
the sample with large BHCs excluded was similar
to the full sample results. The economic signifi-
cance was small as measured by the β coefficients
and the large-change tests. The implication is that
even the potentially most vulnerable banks—small
rural banks not part of relatively large holding
companies—are not strongly influenced by
changes in available measures of county level eco-
nomic activity. 
An interesting question is why performance at
rural banks is not significantly correlated with
county economic data. Perhaps such banks were
vulnerable to local economic conditions in the
past, but changes in intrastate and interstate
branching and acquisition laws, advances in trans-
portation and communication technologies, and
continued integration of domestic markets have
reduced or eliminated this vulnerability. Indeed,
Petersen and Rajan (2000) found that community
banks have increased their lending to more distant
borrowers over time. They found that the distance
between small firms and lenders grew from an
average of 51 miles in the 1970s to 161 miles in
the 1990s. They attributed most of the gain to
improvements in gathering and analyzing infor-
mation. Banks reduced the importance of person-
to-person contact by increasingly relying on finan-
cial statements and credit reports to evaluate
potential borrowers. In addition, Gunther and
Robinson (1999) found that banks faced less risk
from variations in regional economic performance
in 1996 than in 1985 due to industry diversifica-
tion at the state level and geographical diversifica-
tion by banks. Although it is theoretically possible
to test the relationship between bank performance
and county economic activity during a time peri-
od before branching restrictions were widely
relaxed, county-level data limitations reduce the
reliability of these estimates. 
Regardless of whether banks were systemati-
cally vulnerable to local economic conditions in
the past, the result that small rural bank perfor-
mance is only weakly correlated with county eco-
nomic data suggests that geographic concentra-
tion of a bank’s offices may not be a significant
risk factor for these banks today. The results also
suggest that further intrastate branching in Eighth
District states will not significantly affect a bank’s
vulnerability to local economic downturns
because this risk factor is already low.12
Are Noisy Data to Blame?
One caveat in drawing implications from the
lack of correlation between bank performance
measures and county economic data is that the
county data may not be of sufficiently high quality
(see boxed insert). Perhaps rural banks are affect-
ed by county economic conditions but county
labor and income data are so noisy that the statis-
tical correlation is masked. Regardless of whether
banks are insensitive to local economic downturns
12 Because rural bank performance is significantly correlated with
state-level income and labor measures, bank expansion across state
lines is more likely to reduce the bank’s risk. If interstate loan cus-
tomers are influenced by a different set of economic events, then




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































:or the data are noisy, county economic data do
not add systematic value to the risk-focused pro-
cess. If the correlation is masked by noisy data,
however, banks may indeed be vulnerable to local
economic contractions.13
CONCLUSIONS
One aspect of risk-focused supervision
involves identifying potential risk areas so that the
risks can be addressed before a crisis erupts.
Geographical concentration of bank offices and,
hence, operations potentially leaves such banks
vulnerable to local economic downturns. If this
risk factor is important, then, given economic data
of sufficient quality, bank performance of geo-
graphically concentrated banks should be signifi-
cantly correlated with local economic data.
Statistical analysis of small rural banks in the
Federal Reserve’s Eighth District suggests that geo-
graphical concentration is not a significant risk
factor, that bank performance is not significantly
correlated with county economic data, and that
small rural banks in the Eighth District are not
particularly vulnerable to local economic down-
turns. 
Two policy implications arise from these
results. First, a priori, little justification exists for
imposing more stringent regulatory requirements
on banks with geographically concentrated offices
than on other banks. For example, all else equal,
higher capital standards on geographically con-
centrated banks are not warranted. Second, coun-
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To assess the reliability of county economic
data, one must understand how the data are
compiled. Because it is too costly to survey
enough people directly, the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) computes county unemployment
rates by disaggregating state unemployment
rates. When constructing local area unemploy-
ment statistics, the agency must estimate the
number of people unemployed. The BLS con-
structs unemployment estimates by utilizing data
on the number of people currently receiving
unemployment insurance benefits in a county.
A problem with this procedure, of course, is that
insurance benefits may end before the worker
finds a new job. To correct for this bias, the BLS
uses historical trends to estimate the number of
people who have exhausted their benefits. They
also estimate the number of unemployed new
entrants and reentrants into the labor force who
are not eligible or have not filed for unemploy-
ment insurance. To be consistent with the more
reliable state figures, the county unemployment
estimates are adjusted to sum to the state unem-
ployment rate. Clearly, several assumptions must
be made to derive county labor estimates,
increasing the potential for error.
County-level personal income data are also
constructed from state personal income esti-
mates, which in turn are constructed from
national estimates.1 Personal income of an area
is defined as the income received by all the resi-
dents of the area. Because most of the source
data are reported by the “place of work,” the data
must be adjusted to a “place of residence” basis.
Therefore, the adjustments require making
assumptions about cross-county commuting pat-
terns. Data on intercounty commuting are avail-
able only every 10 years; interpolation must be
used for other years by estimating changes in
commuting patterns. Because commuting pat-
terns are likely to change significantly over a 10-
year period, measurement error is surely intro-
duced and increases over the decade.
Source data used to construct local labor and
income estimates are primarily collected for
other purposes; therefore, the additional assump-
tions required to convert these data into county-
level economic data increase the potential for
error. However, as long as assumptions remain
relatively consistent from year to year, then the
change in county labor and income data should
be relatively accurate. Therefore, it is not obvious
that county economic data are so noisy that they
are disguising the true correlation between small
rural banks and local economic activity.
HOW RELIABLE ARE COUNTY-LEVEL ECONOMIC DATA?
13 Although we cannot discern whether our results are driven by
noisy county economic data or that bank performance truly is
independent of local economic conditions, ongoing research sup-
ports the latter hypothesis. Meyer and Yeager (2000) find that small
Eighth District banks with all deposits in a single county bear no
more risk than similar banks with deposits across counties. In
other words, intrastate diversification fails to reduce bank risk,
which is consistent with the hypothesis that small rural banks are
not vulnerable to local economic downturns.
1 Bureau of Economic Analysis (1994).38 MARCH/APRIL 2001
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ty economic data are not systematically useful in
the risk-focused supervision process because the
data are weakly correlated with bank perfor-
mance. 
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